Contact Record	
Contact Record ID:	ONR-TD-CR-21-409
Issue number:	1
Internal record reference:	2022/4870
Title/topic: (include level 1, 2, 3 or 4 if applicable)	Test of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Cell for an off-site radiation emergency at AWE.
Date of contact:	18 January 2022
Date issued:	26 January 2022
Completed/compiled by:	██████████████████████████████ EP&R, Technical Division
Type of contact: (*delete not applicable)	MS Teams
Contact with:	███████████████, West Berkshire District Council ██████████ Health Security Agency (HSA) STAC Chair █████████████████, AWE Comms █████████████, AWE RPA ███████████, AWE RPA Other Representation from: West Berkshire District Council UK HSA South East UK HSA, Chemicals Radiation & Environment Group AWE, Environment Agency, Met Office Thames Water, Thames valley and Hampshire Police, Reading Borough Council (names can be found in joining instructions, references can be found below)
ONR staff:	██████████████, Nuclear Safety Inspector (EP&R), Exercise Assessor,

	██████████████████████████████
	(EP&R), Assessor, ████████████████████████ and STAC player, █████████████████████████ ████████████████████████████ (EP&R), observer.

Summary/key points:

This exercise was a test of the Scientific & Technical Advisory Cell (STAC) of AWE's off-site emergency plan under REPPIR regulation 12. The test was carried out virtually on MS Teams.

Exercise Planning and pre-exercise Information

ONR had previously attended exercise planning meetings (2021/74970, 2021/81844 and 2021/88867).

The following information was provided in advance of the exercise (2022/4785):

- Joining Instructions (containing aims & objectives, format, links to plans and participants) and start presentation,
- STAC agenda,
- Stage 1, 2 & 3 injects (only stage 1 provided to players in advance).
- Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) questions for each stage

Exercise Format

There were three stages to the exercise, with three STAC meetings taking place which each lasted ~ 30 minutes. There were breakout rooms for:

- Local Authority & Emergency Services
- UK HSA
- AWE & ONR
- Environment and
- SCG

Players remained in their breakout rooms to take forward agency actions and answer questions from other agencies, and convened at the STAC meetings to share information.

Areas of Good Practice

- The STAC meetings were well chaired, with ground rules, agenda, references to plans agreed at the start, actions assigned / followed up. Priority was given to most important matters. There was numerous use of the off-site emergency plan. Sensible public health advice was formulated, in response to the questions from the SCG.

Summary/key points:

- The exercise allowed for STAC discussions to be tested throughout the response, from ~2 hours from release to the transition to recovery.
- The exercise was well organised, with wide participation (noting a couple of organisations not available).

Areas for improvement or further consideration

- Testing the STAC alone created artificiality, although partly mitigated by the SCG questions. Similarly, the compressed timescales which allowed the various stages of the response to be tested, limited the test scope and realism.
- There was no place in which written information could be shared/seen to give the common operating picture. It is noted that the compressed timescales did not allow for STAC actions, minutes and agency Sitreps to be created and uploaded to Resilience Direct, which would normally be required. As this was a standalone test of the STAC, the infrastructure around the SCG was not part of the exercise, which furthermore did not facilitate information collation/sharing.
- There was some inconsistent advice as to whether people would be sent into the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ), eg to deliver bottled water, but not carers for vulnerable persons. I did not witness discussions that went into detail on who and why any person should or should not enter the DEPZ.
- The inject of a change in wind direction provided a limited challenge to STAC participants as the protective actions are pre-identified, so the focus would have been on implementation. Discussions did not get into detail on, for example, contingency plans for evacuating vulnerable groups or if the situation worsened and what this meant for the newly affected population.
- There was little focus on the possibility of escalation, and planning for worst case scenarios. An inject in stage 2 identified that the fire re-ignited, but (to my knowledge) this was not followed up.
- Some of the discussion within agency rooms went outside agency roles/responsibilities. May be worth considering whether all participants understand roles and agency responsibilities.
- Fire service, Food Standards Agency, Animal Health Protection Agency were not available for the exercise (noting that participants made use of the off-site emergency plan to understand the advice that would likely have been given).

Hot Debrief

A short debrief followed the exercise in which participants typed answers to questions in the MS Teams chat function. Questions focused on:

- How well MS teams worked and movement between rooms,
- Organisations missing,

Summary/key points:

- Useful or missing /incorrect information within the STAC plan and AWE off-site emergency plan, and
- Parts of the exercise that did and didn't go well.

It wasn't possible to read and collate the responses in the time given. WBDC have since sent out a survey monkey poll to obtain further written feedback and a cold debrief is organised for 1 March 2022.

1 Issues

> **Template Note:** The Contact Record can identify issues raised as a result of the contact; normally the issues will be recorded against the dutyholder/s present. The issue could be raised due to a potential regulatory non-compliance, now, or in the future. These issues should be recorded on the ONR Issues Database after the contact and subsequently tracked and managed. In general, these will be Category 4 issues that can easily be followed up via subsequent contact/interventions. More significant issues should be categorised higher and progressed in the usual manner. Please refer to the Regulatory Issues Management process.

1. Sample paragraph

   - Sample bullet level 1

     o Sample bullet level 2

1.1 Issues raised

Table 1: Issues raised

No.	Issue title	Category	Issue level	Licensee/ dutyholder role	Owner (inspector)	Completion /review date

1.2 Issues closed

Table 2: Issues closed

No.	Issue title	Category	Issue level	Licensee/ duty holder role	Owner (inspector)	Completion /review date

Table 3: Circulation list

Organisation	Name/responsibility	Date
Office for Nuclear Regulation	███████████████████████	On issue

2 Export Control

Yes	
No	X

During this contact, has export controlled information (ECI) been shared outside the UK?

If the answer to the above is **Yes**, please complete **Table 4**.

If the answer is **No**, there is no need to complete **Table 4**.

If you are unsure, please visit the Export Control page on Nucleus to review the guidance available.

Table 4: Export licence use - tracking information

Export licence use - tracking information			
Export licence ref: View Export Licence Library			
Company name and address of end user: View Export Licence Library			
Trigger list information shared: Click here to access guidance.	Choose an item.		
Which reactor technology and/or site is this information regarding?	(e.g., HPR1000, EPR, Sellafield)	**Reason for ECI exchange:**	(e.g., GDA, IAEA mission, design review, supply chain inspection)
Country of ECI technology origin:			
Means of transfer:	**Shared verbally (either via teleconference or videoconference)**		
	Documents shared electronically		
	Documents shared physically		